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need, Stearns offers three simple principles for Christians 
to embrace: “Every one of  these hurting people is created 
in God’s image and loved by him.  Every one of  these 
challenges has a solution.  Every one of  us can make a 
difference” (162).  The technology and resources exist to 
drastically change the circumstances of  the world’s most 
vulnerable, but a concentrated and significant movement 
of  will is needed.  The remainder of  the book shifts focus 
toward the response of  the church and individuals in re-
pairing the hole in the world and in our gospel.  
The most powerful and convicting parts of  in The Hole 
in our Gospel are Parts 4 and 5:“The Hole in the Church” 
and “Repairing the Hole.”  Stearns makes a convincing and 
passionate argument that Christians can and should be the 
ones who lead the charge to change the world.  The Ameri-
can church is the wealthiest group of  Christians in history (216). 
He calculates that if  all churchgoers committed to tithing 
their full ten percent, there would be an extra $168 billion 
per year: “If  every American churchgoer tithed, we could 
literally change the world.  In fact…$65 billion—less than 
40 percent of  the extra $168 billion—could eliminate the 
most extreme poverty on the planet for more than a billion 
people” (218).  Instead of  being known by what we are 
against, the church needs to be known by our successful 
efforts to change the world (228).  Instead of  being com-
fortable with the American Dream (individual hard work 
bringing individual success), we should find comfort in be-
longing to God and being entrusted with, not entitled to, 
His resources (207).  
Stearns laments the failure of  the church’s full partici-
pation in major social change efforts:
If  the Church is indeed a revolutionary kind of  institu-
tion, called to foment a social revolution by promoting 
justice, lifting up the sanctity of  human life, fighting 
for the underdog, and challenging the prevailing value 
systems in our world, then it seems we should be out in 
front on social justice issues rather than bringing up the 
rear” (190).
He shows how the church has lagged behind by citing 
enslavement of  blacks and treatment of  Native Americans 
as examples (190-202).  Although his argument is valid, the 
assumption that the institutional church acts in concen-
trated ways is questionable.  On any issue, there seems to 
be wide and diverse response within the body of  Christ. 
The church certainly should move together to respond to 
the vast need in the world, but it seems Stearns even agrees 
that this response really begins with individuals and small 
groups of  committed people.  He mentions Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., William Wilberforce, and others as ex-
amples of  those who have fought against social injustice 
and inspired others to join the effort.  The chapter “A Tale 
of  Two Real Churches” gives us examples of  how local 
churches saw the need around them and responded with 
action (231-241).  World Vision and other development 
organizations serve as powerful examples of  the impact 
and influence that a few committed Christians can have in 
inspiring organizations that do a great amount of  good.  
Stearns presents a compelling case for the urgency of  
Christians to “repair the hole” in the world.  The final sec-
tion of  the book turns the challenge to us, asking what we 
are going to do with our time, talent, and treasure.  Stearns 
reminds us again that each of  us has a responsibility to 
act and live out the whole Gospel in a world full of  need. 
He does not argue that everyone should join the mission 
field but rather that each should give of  what he or she 
has and use influence and resources to make a difference. 
Interspersed throughout the book are stories of  inspiring 
people and churches that have done amazing things to 
respond to various problems in their neighborhoods and 
around the world.  One small group of  people can change 
the world.  The Hole in our Gospel contains an inspiring and 
convicting message, and Stearns pushes us to imagine a 
world where a concentrated effort of  the church makes a 
drastic difference in the lives of  the world’s most vulner-
able people.  
When and how did liberty arise? How did we arrive 
at multi-party, wide-franchise, secret-ballot elections for 
determining who shall hold office as a legislator? How did 
we arrive at contemporary democracy with all its faults and 
blessings? These closely related questions, and others like 
them, have been posed repeatedly by politicians, lawyers, 
and historians alike. In the West, as public life over the last 
two hundred years has lost clear contact with the Christian 
religion (though is not a whit less religious for all that), the 
tendency has been to answer these questions by ascribing 
a pivotal role to the American and French revolutions. 
Certainly, the period 1763 to 1799 is of  central significance, 
as any careful reader of  Robert R. Palmer’s now classic The 
Age of  the Democratic Revolution (1959-64) will appreciate. 
The question is this: do we owe the things that we prize—
when we speak of  liberty, democracy, and free elections—
pre-eminently to the French Revolution and the frequently 
anti-Christian (and especially anti-Catholic) teachings of  
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the so-called “enlightenment,” which were its guiding 
principles, or must we look elsewhere for the historical 
roots of  what we have come to associate with “liberty”? 
Historians still offer divergent, though not necessarily 
totally contradictory, replies to such questions. This may 
be said of  The Reformation of  Rights, by John Witte, and 
Jonathan Israel’s A Revolution of  the Mind.
English-born Jonathan Israel is one of  the most 
accomplished scholars working on enlightenment studies 
in North America. He was appointed Professor of  Modern 
History at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, 
New Jersey, in 2001. He has to his credit a wide-ranging 
and massively detailed work on the Netherlands: The Dutch 
Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477-1806 (1995). He is 
an authority on Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) and is currently 
at work on a comprehensive three-volume work on the 
“radical” enlightenment, destined to stand alongside 
the work of  Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), and Peter Gay 
(b. 1923). Two immense volumes have appeared so far: 
Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of  Modernity, 
1650-1750 (2001), and Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, 
Modernity, and the Emancipation of  Man 1670-1752 (2009). 
Israel’s much shorter A Revolution of  the Mind may be 
read as a kind of  interim report on the entire project as it 
approaches completion. Israel insists that we distinguish 
between a “moderate” enlightenment, which sought 
gradual improvement, and a “radical” enlightenment, 
which stood more stridently for the sovereignty of  reason 
and, if  need be, for the implementation of  sweeping 
programs of  change (Israel 3, 15, 19). The distinction is 
fundamental (94-6), the radicals emerging as deeply anti-
hierarchical, without being socialists or communists (97). 
He sees Spinoza at the head of  the “radicals” and Pierre 
Bayle (1647-1706) heading the “moderates” (239-41). In 
the crucial period from the 1760s to 1790s, the elites of  
the ancien régime rebuffed the advocates of  gradualism (34-
36). The greater the delay in the substantive rectification 
of  grievances, the more convincing became the call of  
the radicals for a “revolution of  the mind” (38). Here the 
Dutch Patriotten find their context (39, 66-68, 235). As 
other writers have emphasized, they were a harbinger in 
the Netherlands of  what was to come in France. Edmund 
Burke (1729-97) turned against them in 1787, prior to the 
revolution in France (142). According to Israel, the cahiers 
of  1789 testify to the reality of  such a “revolution of  
the mind” in the thinking of  many (198, 229). For him, 
Voltaire (1694-1778) with his critique of  radical writers, 
including Spinoza (208-14, 217), Thomas Reid (1710-96) 
with his focus on the senses (179), and even Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-78) with his emphasis on “sentiment” 
(157), fail to make the cut as “radicals” and are therefore 
numbered among the assorted “moderates” (218-220).
There is much that is provocative in all this. In my 
judgment, Israel is right to point to the question of  slavery 
before 1776 (42-44), as well as to draw attention to the 
shifting meanings of  the word “tyranny” (89, 91). He 
acknowledges that recent history-writing on the intellectual 
origins of  the French Revolution does not reflect the 
fundamental moderate/radical distinction he posits (221-
5, 231). Beyond these points, as Israel acknowledges, “The 
Revolution came and went. It proclaimed liberty, equality, 
and fraternity but failed to establish a viable democratic 
republic” (230). This statement leaves the way open for 
Israel to suggest that after early 1793 “the darker side 
of  the French Revolution” emerged, represented by 
Maximilien Robespierre (1758-94), who “was inspired by 
the Rousseauist tendency.” Indeed, the “Jacobins did not 
hesitate publicly to condemn all the philosophes and the 
whole Enlightenment” (231). Israel would have us ascribe 
the worst crimes and outrages of  the French Revolution 
to its “moderates” rather than to its “radicals”—an 
argument that can be expected to stir the scholarly pot. 
However, although the tables turned yet again with the fall 
of  Robespierre, it was the radical agenda that managed 
to survive, emerging, Israel asserts, as “the official values 
of  a major part of  the world after 1945.” Anglo-America, 
influenced by Locke and others, tended to remain 
“implacably hostile” to the “radical” legacy (235).
Israel’s arguments, while not conclusive, are 
constructively provocative. The complexities of  the 
late enlightenment and tortuous course of  the French 
Revolution call for a carefully nuanced approach. And 
this is certainly what is required when assessing the 
presentation and utilization of  “the revolution” in the 
Stone Lectures on Calvinism, offered by Abraham Kuyper 
(1837-1920) in 1898. It is not always clear to readers how 
Kuyper can laud the Dutch struggle against Spain (1568-
1648) and the British “Glorious Revolution” (1688-90) and 
the American struggle for independence (1776-83) and yet 
be so emphatically anti-revolutionary in regards to France. 
Kuyper bracketed the Dutch, British, and American 
developments together and contrasted them strongly with 
the French Revolution, while many others—including 
many in the 1780s—saw great continuities between the 
American and French events. Persons adopting the latter 
standpoint tend to see democracy arising in the 1770s and 
‘80s. 
Others, like John Witte, will adopt a less convulsive 
and more gradualist view of  historical change. His focus 
is the long-term pre-French revolutionary and partly pre-
enlightenment reformed struggle for religious rights. This 
author will be known to some Pro Rege readers as a student 
of  the late H. Evan Runner and as a prolific author in the 
fields of  jurisprudence and the history of  law, not least on 
the relationship of  religion to law in regards to marriage 
and the family. In 2002 he published Law and Protestantism: 
The Legal Teachings of  the Lutheran Reformation. The work 
now before us, The Reformation of  Rights, is essentially a 
continuation of  the earlier work, but with the emphasis on 
the Calvinistic reformation and particularly on its leading 
public-legal consequences. Witte is Jonas Robitscher 
Professor of  Law and Director of  the Center for the 
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Study of  Law and Religion at Emory University, Atlanta, 
Georgia.
Witte’s purpose is to explore how the Calvinistic 
reformation, notwithstanding its original orientation 
towards religious uniformity, became an early-modern 
“midwife,” ushering in the kind of  law-state which 
supported or opened the way for significant measures of  
legally recognized religious diversity (Witte 1-5). His intent 
is to make more explicit the seriously neglected part played 
by Calvinists, Huguenots, Puritans, and Covenanters in this 
process (20 ff.). The groundwork is first laid by considering 
the initial Calvinistic reformation—“the original Genevan 
experiment” (39 ff.). Of  course, in the complexities of  
historical change, intentions and outcomes are rarely 
identical. Calvin, like the other early reformers, never 
advocated what later generations would call “freedom 
of  religion” or “principled pluralism.” In the context of  
the times, Geneva steered a course between Lutheran 
tendencies toward subordination to the civil authority 
and the Anabaptist depreciation, avoidance, and even 
sometimes repudiation thereof  (4, 43). Calvin’s “two-
kingdoms” were not those of  either (43-45). Of  central 
significance was Calvin’s insistence on the clear distinction 
between church and the civil authority—“two clear 
distinct areas of  responsibility” (75). This, of  course, had 
the effect of  placing such reformed churches in the way 
of  any monarchy (Catholic or Protestant) that presumed 
to lay down the law to the church in matters intrinsically 
ecclesiastical.    
In the central part of  his work, Witte explores how 
successive generations of  reformed advocates and 
apologists developed arguments doctrinal, legal, and 
historical in order to gain from princes and jurisdictions 
the public-legal space necessary to worship and live with a 
good conscience. He does so with successive discussions 
of  “those figures who stood tallest in times of  crisis and 
challenge” (19). They were Theodore Beza (1519-1605), 
Johannes Althusius (1563-1638), and John Milton (1608-
74) of  the Commonwealth of  England (81-275). From the 
English Puritans, Witte transitions to a consideration of  
the New England Puritan thinking that provided the basis 
and framework of  the reflections of  men such as John 
Adams (1735-1836) and his associates (277-319). This 
central portion of  the book is rich in detail and lush with 
insight, especially on Beza and Althusius, providing the 
Anglophone reader with a depth of  discussion not readily 
available elsewhere. A gem from Beza begs for quotation: 
“The people are not made for rulers, but rulers for the 
people” (7, 139). One is tempted to add for the twenty-first 
century: “People are not made for the market, but markets 
for the people” (cf. Mark 2: 27). 
Witte’s expositions are at once adroit and judicious—
as in his discussion of  Milton’s theology (230-34, 271-2). 
And there is much here that will repay further exploration. 
For Witte, it was the Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacre 
(1572) that prompted Calvinist jurisprudence to focus 
on “law and religion, authority and liberty, rights and 
resistance” (85 ff.). In the writings of  George Buchanan 
(1506-82) and François Hotman (1524-90) we encounter 
an approach to the legal past (136-7) synchronous with 
the orientation of  the (original) “Society of  Antiquaries” 
founded in England around 1572 and regarded by Herbert 
Butterfield as central in the establishment of  the initial 
version of  the protestant and Whig interpretation of  
history.  Witte’s topic, therefore, plays into the history of  
the interpretation of  history, itself  a central theme in the 
history of  historiography.
While each book stands alone, both are parts of  larger 
projects. There is more than enough in A Revolution of  the 
Mind for us to look forward keenly to the third volume of  
Israel’s magnum opus on the radical enlightenment. Although 
it is not his intention, his work may prove invaluable in 
identifying and elucidating the problems surrounding 
Kuyper’s characterization of  both American and French 
revolutions in his Stone Lectures. Witte certainly feels the 
pull of  Kuyper on his study, but the remarks that he offers 
here focus on Kuyper’s view of  the American experience 
rather than on his presentation of  the French Revolution 
(321-9). However, Witte hints at “a later volume or two” 
where we might expect Kuyper and his successors to 
receive fuller treatment (19). The forthcoming work of  
both scholars will be eagerly anticipated. In differing ways 
they can be expected to enhance our reading of  Kuyper’s 
famous lectures.
In their short and easy-to-read paperback book When 
Helping Hurts, Steve Corbett and Brian Fikkert leave no 
doubt about two of  their primary beliefs: that Christians 
need to be more concerned about the poor, and that 
they need to change many of  their well-intentioned but 
counter-productive methods of  helping the poor.  Given 
the credentials and experience of  these two Covenant 
College professors, the Christian community and especially 
those who work directly with disadvantaged groups 
would be well advised to consider their words.  Steve 
Corbett is a Community Development Specialist for the 
Chalmers Center for Economic Development and the 
former Regional (Central and South America) Director 
for Food for the Hungry International.  Dordt graduate 
Corbett, Steve, and Brian Fikkert.  When Helping Hurts: How to Alleviate Poverty Without Hurting the 
Poor and Yourself. Chicago: Moody, 2009. 230 pages. ISBN:978-0-8024-5705-9.  Reviewed by Dr. John 
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